By popular demand, we wish to provide our readership the fond memory of former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, who have led us down the road of mass taxpayer money infused into failed American businesses.

But testifying before Congress is not new to Hank Paulson prior to September 2008 when the US financial meltdown had occurred.  Back in 2000, Hank Paulson was the CEO of Goldman Sachs and often influenced the regulatory decisions that Congress were to make.  Goldman Sachs ultimately received nearly $14 billion of taxpayer funds that was pumped into AIG for the purpose of keeping the US financial system intact.  Conflict of interest anybody?  In addition, since Goldman Sachs received TARP funding, couldn’t Congress have negotiated how much Goldman Sachs received at something less than face value of the Credit Default Swaps?  Because, if AIG was put into bankruptcy, Goldman Sachs would have received very little of the $14 billion from AIG.

Now to be fair to Congress and its oversight accountability, there were many questions asked and the desire for better understanding of what they were getting US taxpayers into.  But we all know how bureaucracy works in this country.

From the New York Times:

Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR TREASURY AUTHORITY

TO PURCHASE MORTGAGE-RELATED ASSETS

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as ____________________.

Sec. 2. Purchases of Mortgage-Related Assets.

(a) Authority to Purchase.–The Secretary is authorized to purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, on such terms and conditions as determined by the Secretary, mortgage-related assets from any financial institution having its headquarters in the United States.

(b) Necessary Actions.–The Secretary is authorized to take such actions as the Secretary deems necessary to carry out the authorities in this Act, including, without limitation:

(1) appointing such employees as may be required to carry out the authorities in this Act and defining their duties;

(2) entering into contracts, including contracts for services authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, without regard to any other provision of law regarding public contracts;

(3) designating financial institutions as financial agents of the Government, and they shall perform all such reasonable duties related to this Act as financial agents of the Government as may be required of them;

(4) establishing vehicles that are authorized, subject to supervision by the Secretary, to purchase mortgage-related assets and issue obligations; and

(5) issuing such regulations and other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to define terms or carry out the authorities of this Act.

Sec. 3. Considerations.

In exercising the authorities granted in this Act, the Secretary shall take into consideration means for–

(1) providing stability or preventing disruption to the financial markets or banking system; and

(2) protecting the taxpayer.

Sec. 4. Reports to Congress.

Within three months of the first exercise of the authority granted in section 2(a), and semiannually thereafter, the Secretary shall report to the Committees on the Budget, Financial Services, and Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committees on the Budget, Finance, and Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate with respect to the authorities exercised under this Act and the considerations required by section 3.

Sec. 5. Rights; Management; Sale of Mortgage-Related Assets.

(a) Exercise of Rights.–The Secretary may, at any time, exercise any rights received in connection with mortgage-related assets purchased under this Act.

(b) Management of Mortgage-Related Assets.–The Secretary shall have authority to manage mortgage-related assets purchased under this Act, including revenues and portfolio risks therefrom.

(c) Sale of Mortgage-Related Assets.–The Secretary may, at any time, upon terms and conditions and at prices determined by the Secretary, sell, or enter into securities loans, repurchase transactions or other financial transactions in regard to, any mortgage-related asset purchased under this Act.

(d) Application of Sunset to Mortgage-Related Assets.–The authority of the Secretary to hold any mortgage-related asset purchased under this Act before the termination date in section 9, or to purchase or fund the purchase of a mortgage-related asset under a commitment entered into before the termination date in section 9, is not subject to the provisions of section 9.

Sec. 6. Maximum Amount of Authorized Purchases.

The Secretary’s authority to purchase mortgage-related assets under this Act shall be limited to $700,000,000,000 outstanding at any one time

Sec. 7. Funding.

For the purpose of the authorities granted in this Act, and for the costs of administering those authorities, the Secretary may use the proceeds of the sale of any securities issued under chapter 31 of title 31, United States Code, and the purposes for which securities may be issued under chapter 31 of title 31, United States Code, are extended to include actions authorized by this Act, including the payment of administrative expenses. Any funds expended for actions authorized by this Act, including the payment of administrative expenses, shall be deemed appropriated at the time of such expenditure.

Sec. 8. Review.

Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.

Sec. 9. Termination of Authority.

The authorities under this Act, with the exception of authorities granted in sections 2(b)(5), 5 and 7, shall terminate two years from the date of enactment of this Act.

Sec. 10. Increase in Statutory Limit on the Public Debt.

Subsection (b) of section 3101 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking out the dollar limitation contained in such subsection and inserting in lieu thereof $11,315,000,000,000.

Sec. 11. Credit Reform.

The costs of purchases of mortgage-related assets made under section 2(a) of this Act shall be determined as provided under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, as applicable.

Sec. 12. Definitions.

For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:

(1) Mortgage-Related Assets.–The term “mortgage-related assets” means residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each case was originated or issued on or before September 17, 2008.

(2) Secretary.–The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Treasury.

(3) United States.–The term “United States” means the States, territories, and possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia.

Here’s are videos of the testimony and the afterward public opinion.

US Treasury Secretary Urging Bailout of US Financial Institution

BBC Surveys Public Opinion

Since there are no markets or buyers for these toxic assets, the bailed out banks who received taxpayers money through TARP or TALF will now trade these toxic assets between themselves to create the illusion that these assets are being moved.  By doing so these banks can agree on a “price” therefore artificially establishing a value to something that currently have no buyers and side stepping any generally accepted accounting rules or regulation such as “mark to market” per FASB.

This is is a real danger to American taxpayers and other investors of not replacing the senior management and the boards that supposedly watch over them.

How long will Americans wait for results from the trillions spent by the US Government supported by the Obama administration?
Bailed-out banks may buy toxic assets: report

• Friday April 3, 2009, 9:19 am EDT

How will Wall St respond to this?  Not well I imagine, but no short term pain then no long term gain.  Isn’t this the type of change President Obama was promising or was that just another unfulfilled Washington campaign promise long gone by.

Part I: Geithner’s Plan “Extremely Dangerous,” Economist Galbraith Says

From The Business Insider, March 23, 2009:

Tim Geithner has finally revealed his plan to fix the banking system and economy.  Paul Krugman, James Galbraith, and others have already trashed it.

[We spoke with noted economist Galbraith this morning. In the accompanying segment, he calls the Treasury Secretary’s plan “extremely dangerous.”]

Why?

In short, because the plan is yet another massive, ineffective gift to banks and Wall Street. Taxpayers, of course, will take the hit

Why does Tim Geithner keep repackaging the same trash-asset-removal plan that he has been trying to get approved since last fall?

In our opinion, because Tim Geithner formed his view of this crisis last fall, while sitting across the table from his constituents at the New York Fed: The CEOs of the big Wall Street firms.  He views the crisis the same way Wall Street does–as a temporary liquidity problem–and his plans to fix it are designed with the best interests of Wall Street in mind.

If Geithner’s plan to fix the banks would also fix the economy, this would be tolerable.  But no smart economist we know of thinks that it will.

We think Geithner is suffering from five fundamental misconceptions about what is wrong with the economy.  Here they are:

The trouble with the economy is that the banks aren’t lending. The reality: The economy is in trouble because American consumers and businesses took on way too much debt and are now collapsing under the weight of it.  As consumers retrench, companies that sell to them are retrenching, thus exacerbating the problem.  The banks, meanwhile, are lending.  They just aren’t lending as much as they used to.  Also the shadow banking system (securitization markets), which actually provided more funding to the economy than the banks, has collapsed.

The banks aren’t lending because their balance sheets are loaded with “bad assets” that the market has temporarily mispriced. The reality: The banks aren’t lending (much) because they have decided to stop making loans to people and companies who can’t pay them back.  And because the banks are scared that future writedowns on their old loans will lead to future losses that will wipe out their equity.

Bad assets are “bad” because the market doesn’t understand how much they are really worth. The reality: The bad assets are bad because they are worth less than the banks say they are.  House prices have dropped by nearly 30% nationwide.  That has created something in the neighborhood of $5+ trillion of losses in residential real estate alone (off a peak market value of housing about $20+ trillion).   The banks don’t want to take their share of those losses because doing so will wipe them out.  So they, and Geithner, are doing everything they can to pawn the losses off on the taxpayer.

Once we get the “bad assets” off bank balance sheets, the banks will start lending again. The reality: The banks will remain cautious about lending, because the housing market and economy are still deteriorating. So they’ll sit there and say they are lending while waiting for the economy to bottom.

Once the banks start lending, the economy will recover. The reality: American consumers still have debt coming out of their ears, and they’ll be working it off for years.  House prices are still falling.  Retirement savings have been crushed.  Americans need to increase their savings rate from today’s 5% (a vast improvement from the 0% rate of two years ago) to the 10% long-term average.  Consumers don’t have room to take on more debt, even if the banks are willing to give it to them.

The two charts below from Ned Davis illustrate the real problem: An explosion of debt relative to GDP.  The first is Nonfinancial Debt To GDP.  The second is Total Debt To GDP.

In Geithner’s plan, this debt won’t disappear.  It will just be passed from banks to taxpayers, where it will sit until the government finally admits that a major portion of it will never be paid back.

For more coverage including charts, see The Business Insider.

Part II: Geithner, Obama Kowtowing to “Massively Corrupted” Banks, Galbraith Says

Like it or not, many people seem to be resigned to the idea there’s no alternative to the public-private investment fund scheme Treasury Secretary Geithner detailed this morning. (Click here for part one of our discussion of the plan.)

That’s hogwash, says University of Texas professor James Galbraith, author of The Predator State. Of course there’s an alternative: FDIC receivership of insolvent banks.

Aside from being legally proscribed, the upside of FDIC receivership is the banks are restructured and reorganized for potential sale (either in whole or parts), Galbraith says. Such was the fate in 2008 of, most notably, Washington Mutual and IndyMac.

Crucially, FDIC receivership also means new management teams for insolvent banks; and Galbraith notes new leaders will have no incentive to cover up the fraudulent or predatory lending practices of their predecessors. Given the entire system was “massively corrupted by the subprime debacle,” the professor believes criminal prosecutions on par with the aftermath of the S&L crisis – when hundreds of insiders went to jail – is a likely (and necessary) outcome of the current crisis.

But don’t expect to see many “perp walks” if Geithner’s current plan comes to fruition. That’s one reason Galbraith called the plan “extremely dangerous” in part one of our interview.

So why isn’t the Obama administration pushing for FDIC receivership? “Political influence of big banks,” the economist says.

Other renown economists agree.  One is Paul Krugman of Princeton University, NY Times Columnist and Nobel Prize winner feels Geithner’s plan won’t work and disagrees with with Larry Summers and Ben Bernanke in addition to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Why is government leaderships on both sides of the aisle so hesitant from exploring other options such as the one presented by Galbraith and Krugman?  Is it because it does involve the take over of many of these banks into receivorship and hence breacking the control of current management, shareholders and the contracts that these institutions hold?

Or is it the special interest money that finds its way to campaign funds that make politicians hesitant to be as objective as they should and need to be in the full interest of all Americans and their long term interests but not just those that are tied to the banks?

Looking at the tally of money (source:  opensecrets.org) contributed to our federal government campaigns by commercial banks, it is no small amount.